Many philosophers of biology accept some form of realism about species. Accounting for their reality, however, has proved challenging. Proposals about what ontological category species taxa belong to seem either to face serious difficulties or involve contentious metaphysical commitments. In this paper, I shall sketch a strategy for accommodating the reality of species without with minimal metaphysical engagement. My proposal involves treating species names as plural referring expressions. The question of species realism becomes a biological question of the proper application conditions for such expressions.
ON THE REALITY OF SPECIES
It is difficult not to be struck by the distinctness of many species. The rudimentary idea of a species (or anyway of a certain kind of plant or animal) needs no advanced biological training (Mayr 1987, 146) . As such, species are deeply embedded in both scientific investigation and everyday enthusiasm. Many members of our species go to considerable effort and expense to watch, document, count, breed, cultivate, hunt, and conserve other species. Scientists often report discovering new species, estimating that there are ten million distinct species presently on earth (and many more that have disappeared). Species membership is explanatorily fertile and inferentially useful. Reference to particular biological species is commonplace. Not only do we use species names as predicates (as in 'Gao Gao is a panda'), but we also apparently use them as singular terms (as in 'The panda eats bamboo'); and these claims are true. For these and other reasons, many see species as objective, mind-independent features of the world. If you share this intuition -and you may not (Ereshefsky 1992; Stanford 1995 
) -a question immediately arises. To what do such terms refer?
Two main contenders have dominated the debate: that species are sets (or classes) and that species are individuals. Unfortunately, neither has the resources to accommodate all of the uses to which we put species names. I shall have to be rather quick with the reasons for their failures which concern intricacies of metaphysics and biological practice, discussion of which considerably exceeds the scope of this paper.
1 My main purpose is to make some headway in describing an alternative view of how reference to species works. I shall argue that species names are best understood as non-rigid plural referring expressions. Yet the organisms to which a species name refers may, in a sense, be a natural kind in the sense of possessing the properties and relations that suit them for inferential and explanatory use in biological science and beyond. 2 I suspect that what I have to say about species would apply mutatis mutandis to other natural kinds, but I do not want to claim that the picture I paint here should be true of natural kind reference in general. Indeed, given that it seems that some natural kinds may possess essences (physicochemical kinds, perhaps) and some may not (species, I think), I am skeptical that we should be looking for a general theory of what natural kind terms refer to and how that reference is fixed.
We begin with a short tour of the problems with previous answers to the question of species' ontological category ( §2). I shall sketch my approach to species reference in §3, outline some suggestions for further lines of inquiry in §4, and conclude with a discussion of the sense in which the approach allows for the reality of species.
PREVIOUS FAILURES

Species as Traditional Natural Kinds
As I intimated above, one of the chief motivations for realism about species involves their inferential and explanatory fertility. What underpins these epistemic virtues? What allows explanations from species membership to pass as good explanations? The popular answer used to be that species are natural kinds united by a shared essence -a deep, underlying property (perhaps genetic) that explains why members of that species are they way they are. More specifically, such essences typically give rise to "stable pools of homogeneity". As Putnam put it, natural kinds terms designate "classes of things that we regard as of explanatory importance: classes whose normal distinguishing characteristics are 'held together' or even explained by deep-lying mechanisms. Gold, lemon, tiger, acid, are examples of such nouns" (1975, 139) .
There are two classes of worries with this proposal. One is philosophical, having to do with our ability to discover such essences and whether reference to natural kinds is, as Kripke and Putnam have it, a direct matter (Zemach 1976; Mellor 1977; Stanford and Kitcher 2000; LaPorte 2004) . Another is empirical and specific to biological kinds: even if the direct-reference view can be vindicated from the philosophical worries, flagship biological kinds like species appear to lack even candidates for essences (Dupré 1981; Okasha 2002; Wilson 2005) . As such, the thesis that species are natural kinds individuated by intrinsic essences has fallen into deep disfavor (though cf. Devitt 2008) . Hope still exists, though, that a non-essentialist elaboration of the traditional view of natural kinds might vindicate this basic view of species.
Species as Individuals
Motivated in large part by the trend for historical, non-similarity based accounts of species, and concerns over what were assumed to be many problematic implications of the view that species were natural kinds, many philosophers and biologists adopted a "radical solution" to the species problem: that, as Ghiselin trenchantly put it, "Species are individuals and they are real!" (1974, 536) . More specifically, that species are composite "concrete particular persisting objects" (Crane 2004, 160) .
Though the species-as-individuals (SAI) thesis remains perhaps the dominant metaphysics of species, it too faces several serious worries. In the first place, many of the early arguments advanced for the thesis seemed on reflection clearly flawed (Kitts and Kitts 1979; Kitcher 1984a Kitcher , 1989 . Further arguments surfaced. Coleman and Wiley, for example, take a semantic approach, examining "typical statements biologists make about species", revealing "how species are conceptualized, what they are thought to be" (2001, 500) . They thus begin their argument by indicating how biological talk is prima facie committed the existence of species:
Biological theory is replete with generalizations that seem to be about particular things called "species." The generalizations "There are species" and "Species are variable" appear to be statements that are truly or falsely said about species and not about the organisms that comprise a species. . . . Thus, one way to interpret discourse about species is to understand at least some of the expressions used to talk about particular species taxa as genuine singular terms (i.e., as terms referring to particular things rather than designating kinds of things). (ibid.) Thus, insofar as our best theories quantify over particular entities called species, we have good reason to accept that species are individuals and genuine features of the world.
This line of argument is also weak. We have been repeatedly reminded of the opacity of the existential idiom (Quine 1983, 500) . Surface grammar is a poor a guide to ontological commitment (in biology as elsewhere) -even when that grammar evinces not the slightest hint of ambiguity. The question is not just whether surface grammar inclines us to treat species names as singular terms, but whether a particular picture of the referents of those terms stands up to philosophical scrutiny. I think the answer to this question is no. The SAI metaphysic is out of step with they way biologists think of species (even if they do not always clearly recognize this). I shall briefly describe two reasons here.
The first problem stems from the transitivity of parthood. In general, if A is a part of B, and B is a part of C, then A is a part of C. One very natural interpretation of SAI involves recasting locutions about species membership into the language of parthood as a way of conferring objectivity on species composition. My humanity, on this approach, inheres not in my possessing some intrinsic essential property, but in my bearing the parthood relation with some "species-individual", some object composed of all the humans. On this view, we are all literally "part of something larger"! Call this object 'Homo sapiens'. But we all have parts; and by transitivity of parthood, Homo sapiens has them too. So in addition to particular humans, Homo sapiens has as parts spleens, kidneys, pacemakers, titanium screws, cells, atoms, and whatever else any human has as parts. But while my spleen happens to be a human spleen, it is not itself a human! The second problem involves the fact that speciations are not always sharply defined events. Every conception of what divides species from one another -and thus when a species comes to be -admits of vagueness. If this vagueness is genuine (in the sense of being a non-linguistic, non-epistemic, so-called "ontic" feature of the world), then SAI-ists must countenance ontically-indeterminate parthood and potentially indeterminate existence. That is too tough a pill for me to swallow -and I am not alone (Lewis 1986, 212; Sider 2003) . But since neither the semantic or epistemic approaches to vagueness adequately handles the vagueness of species-parthood, SAI is stuck either admitting the possibility of ontic vague existence (a view that is at best deeply controversial) or denying that contemporary species concepts admit of vagueness (which seems undeniable). I conclude that SAI is in deep trouble.
I have not said why I think the semantic and epistemic approaches to species are unable to handle species, so I don't expect you to believe me about this. But perhaps I could gain your assent to move forward by pointing out that on either approach, we will quite probably have to meddle considerably with "common sense". Briefly: Semantic approaches to vagueness require multiple reference candidates -thus, they are typically favored by those who espouse profligate principles of composition (e.g., Mereological Universalism, à la Lewis 1991) . On the other hand, Epistemicism, the view of vagueness developed by Sorensen (1988 Sorensen ( , 2001 and Williamson (1994) is also frequently met with incredulous stares because of its dutiful adherence to there always being a fact of the matter for every predicate about whether it applies to a given object or not, even in apparently borderline cases.
Species as Sets
Perhaps the most natural view of species reference, particularly given these failures, is that species names refer to sets. In his classic paper, "Species", Kitcher even notes this thesis "seems banal " (1984a, 310) . Now there is certainly a sense in which Kitcher is correct that the claim is obvious: however one characterizes species, they are ultimately made up by a bunch of organisms. This seems pretty undeniable (even for philosophers). What is less clear is whether this banal fact ought to translate into the claim that species are indeed a certain kind of abstract object. When Kitcher's paper came out, SAI-defenders were already quite concerned about that damage this view would wreak in biology. Indeed, this concern comprised a large portion of their case for SAI. Much of this concern devolved from confusions. For instance, they imagined their opponents claiming that species were classes -a notion that Kitcher dispelled, charitably interpreting Ghiselin and Hull as having in mind sets (Kitcher 1987, 185) . They suggested that a "nominalistic species concept" would deny reality to species by identifying them with classes, which were not real (Ghiselin 1974, 542) . Or if not nonexistence, they claimed that treating species as classes rather than individuals would foist upon biology a long outmoded typological view of species (Hull 1978, 336) . 3 Kitcher patiently explained how these worries were unfounded (1984a, 1984b, 1987) . But he himself anticipated a much more serious worry about Species-as-Sets (SAS) stemming from the abstractness of sets. As he put it: "Species evolve. Sets are atemporal entities. Hence sets cannot evolve. Therefore species are not sets" (1984a, 311). Rumfit considers a related worry about sets not having spatiotemporal location. In discussing Burge's claim that phrases like 'The stars that presently make up the Pleiades galactic cluster' are semantically singular terms, referring to sets of stars (Burge 1977, 98) , he notes that sentences like 'The stars that presently make up the Pleiades galactic cluster occupy an area that measures 700 cubic light years' are literally false if 'the Pleiades galactic cluster' refers to a set of stars. "In the ordinary sense of 'occupy', a set is not the sort of thing that occupies space" (Rumfitt 2005, 89) . The same point applies to species: 'Tigers are generally found in Eastern Asia' is true, but the set containing all tigers is not to be "found" anywhere -it is an abstract object. Another mismatch involves modal differences between sets and the intuitive referents of species names. In a same-issue reply to Kitcher's (1984a) , Elliott Sober (1984, 337) noted that the identity conditions of sets and species differ. Sets are defined by their extensions; species are not.
Kitcher did not see such problems as serious, suggesting that they turn on a "fallacy of incomplete translation" (1984, 311) . The idea is that we can locate "an extraordinary sense in which a set may be said to occupy space" (Rumfitt 2005, 90) . Sets of organisms or stars can have location in a derivative sense (in virtue of their members' location). But while undoubtedly possible and convenient to employ set theory to talk of organisms, it's less clear that species are sets -still less that we should be forced into baroque translation schemes and an ontology of sets. It scarcely seems that biological practice reveals the existence of an uncountable infinity of abstract objects! A more straightforward approach seems preferable.
A DEFLATIONARY APPROACH TO SPECIES METAPHYSICS
In the balance of this paper, I shall explore the suggestion that many, if not all, uses of species names are best understood as plural referring expressions. This proposal need not be seen as a "metaphysics of species". One might view it as a claim about the semantic value of words like 'tiger' in sentences like 'The tiger is a top carnivore' -a claim onto which a metaphysics of species might be grafted. Or one might view it instead as a revisionary metaphysic along the lines of van Inwagen's (1990) concerning composite artifacts: that there is nothing -no single thing -to which 'tiger' refers. Absent this further denial, the view that species names are (often) plural referring expressions may even be congenial to those who would opt for a more substantial metaphysics of species (like SAS or SAI). These are all options between which I do not think we should feel compelled to choose. It is not necessary to adopt one of these metaphysics (or any serious metaphysics) in order to uphold the intuition that species are real.
Let us return briefly to the considerations raised by Ghiselin, Coleman, and Wiley in support of SAI. It often seemed that Ghiselin's examples of individuals were somewhat ill-chosen. He wrote that species are "as real as American Motors, Chrysler, Ford and General Motors" (1974, 537) . Or consider his later description of individuals:
Individuals are single things, including compound objects made up of parts -such as ourselves, and also every cell and atom in our bodies. Such parts need not be physically connected -a baseball team is an individual made up of players. Individuals each have a definite location in space and time. In general they are designated by proper names -such as "Ernst Mayr" or "Canada." (1987, 128) It's worth pursuing this analogy to organizations, corporations, and teams a bit. Even if such things are picked out by singular terms -'Google', 'the Chicago Cubs', 'The Supreme Court' -, it scarcely seems obvious that what those terms pick out are individual things in any metaphysically robust sense.
Granted, so long as we abjure baroque translation schemes, the view that those names refer to sets -say, of people who work for, play for and coach, or serve on Google, the Chicago Cubs, and the Supreme Court -is in even worse shape. We have already mentioned the reasons: sets have the different persistence conditions through time and possible worlds than these things; they are not located in spacetime (except parasitically). But this is no reason to see corporations, teams, and courts as composite objects. Indeed, doing so looks at best quite challenging. Unless we are to take corporate law as dictating (in part) how parthood works, then it might seem a strange coincidence that some people scattered about space, working on computers, who happen to receive a paycheck from Google, should somehow compose an object that we call 'Google'. Or perhaps Mereological Universalism is true and composition is automatic (for any collection of things, there's something that's composed of them -their "mereological sum"). Then no matter what people we have in mind (no matter who signs their checks), those people compose something. In that case, while there is a thing we might refer to when we use the name 'Google', this thing has the wrong identity conditions (cf. Uzquiano 2004, 136) . When someone is fired, this affects their employment at Google, but has zero impact on whether they are part of the aforementioned mereological sum. To capture these corporate goings on, we would need a time-indexed series of mereological sums to "do duty for" Google in something like the Four-Dimensionalist style (Sider 2001) .
While I realize that Four-Dimensionalism (often conjoined with Mereological Universalism) is a popular solution to familiar problems of identity over time, it seems a rather facile answer to the question of what 'Google' or 'the tigers' refer to: for reference candidates are everywhere ready to hand. And yet it strikes me again as rather a lot to swallow. As van Inwagen put it concerning Universalism, "it does not seem to force itself upon the mind as true" (1990, 74). That's an understatement. Does giving up on these options not put us in an awkward position? For surely, Ghiselin might say, 'the Chicago Cubs' refers to something and that something is not a set. Thus it is an individual! This is subtle issue. It's uncontroversial that 'The Chicago Cubs' typically functions not as a predicate, but as a name of something to which other properties and activities are predicated; as in: 'The Cubs are a baseball team', 'The Cubs lack a competent pitcher', 'The Cubs play in Wrigley Field', 'The Cubs are going to win this year', and so on. What is controversial is whether there is really any such thing -a composite object -as the Chicago Cubs.
Now we philosophers know to express such doubts carefully (especially to Cubs fans) lest we be treated to righteous retorts like "Well who exactly were we watching last night in Wrigley Field?!" This sort of speech in reply should by now sound familiar:
Denying the existence of the Cubs doesn't mean that we can't go to their games any more than denying the existence of holes means that we don't have to watch where we step. Of course we went to a Cubs game last night, and before that we bought a six pack of beers. But do you think that there is any such object as a six pack? Granted there were six individual bottles of beer. But did those bottles compose a concrete, persisting object -or is the phrase 'six pack of beer' instead a convenient way of speaking about some bottles of beer?
If that analogy does work, we can swap in talk of dining sets, archipelagos, galaxies, and so forth -examples to which many will likely resist granting genuine, concrete, composite-object-status.
Suppose we convince our Cubs fan of the dubious ontological standing of her favored team (perhaps by rehearsing pointed questions about when, in general, some objects compose a further thing). She accepts that her favorite team is perhaps not among the "furniture of the world" in the same sense in which this rock or tree is. She recognizes equivocal uses of 'part'. She gets the hang of the distinctions which allow us to avoid postulating collective hallucination about the previous night. It seems that we can still agree that her team is an individual. For in this context, this amounts to a claim about the grammatical role of the name -hardly a substantive thesis about the metaphysics of teams. 4 Establishing that species are individuals in some robust sense as these would seem to require more than shallow investigation into what statements biologists make in the course of their work or whether species terms function as "proper names". After all, the semantic mark of being designatable by a proper name is arguably parasitic upon an estimation of whether something is an individual (this is, after all, what pushed Russell to his theory of descriptions: a lack of suitable referents). But nor is the SAI thesis, as Ruse puts it, a straightforward empirical claim (as in "Look! There's an individual!"): "rather, it is more the conceptual claim, whose plausibility must be argued for. Consider a chessboard. You can think of this as an individual, made up of 64 parts, or as a class of 64 squares. It depends on your perspective as to which makes more sense…. The crux of the [SAI] thesis, therefore, is whether modern evolutionary biology inclines one to treat species more as individuals, or more as classes, as natural kinds" (Ruse 1987, 230-231) .
Though I'm sympathetic to Ruse's criticism, I think he too offers us a false dichotomy. Defenders of the Species-as-Individuals and Species-as-Sets views alike tend to take a myopic view of our options for constructing a metaphysics of species, often seeing the other as the only alternative and arguing by way of disjunctive syllogism. 5 Here is a third alternative: strictly-speaking, there are no species (cf. Stanford 1995) conceived of as single things, and thus that there is no debate about what ontological category species fall into. Put this way, the view seems radical. Wouldn't we be better off just accepting Mereological Universalism or that species are sets or kinds? How, after all, can we deny the evident reality of species? In much the same way, I answer, that we make sense of the obvious fact that we went to a Cubs game last night while denying that there is any such object as the Cubs. We speak truthfully when we say that there is a team we just saw that was entirely located in Wrigley Field, whose pitcher was incompetent, but that nevertheless won the game. But it is not because the name 'the Cubs' refers to some particular object (or to some set); rather 'the Cubs' is a plural referring expression. It refers not to some particular entity, but collectively to many entities. This is not, I hasten to add, covert reference to a set of Cubs players. The idea is precisely to avoid quantification over such abstracta. Consider Boolos:
One might doubt, for example, that there is such a thing as the set of Cheerios in the (other) bowl on the table. There are, of course, quite a lot of Cheerios in that bowl, well over two hundred of them. But is there, in addition to the Cheerios, also a set of them all? And what about the >10 60 subsets of that set? (And don't forget about the sets of sets of the Cheerios in the bowl.) It is haywire to think that when you have some Cheerios, you are eating a set -what you are doing is: eating THE CHEERIOS.…[N]either the use of plurals and second-order logic commits us to the existence of extra items beyond those to which are already committed. (Boolos 1984, 448-449) I suggest that we say something similar about species. Suppose that, strictly and literally speaking, there are organisms. Many of these organisms possess properties and bear relations to one another which biologists justifiably find of interest. Must they thus be united into objects or sets? I cannot see why. For we can still pick out those organisms in our discourse by means of plural quantification and plural referring terms.
Consider the sentence 'The lion is disappearing from the Serengeti Plain' (Wolf 2002, 82) . Notice that treating 'the lion' (or even 'lions') as referring to a single object or a set would require a pretty radical reinterpretation of the predicate 'is disappearing from the Serengeti Plain' if it is to express a truth. Likewise, traditional quantificational approaches present difficulties. Suppose we try to symbolize the sentence as 'For all x, if x is a lion, then x is disappearing from the Serengeti Plain': this clearly misrepresents its logical form. We do not wish to say of each lion that it is disappearing, but that the population is shrinking. A traditional existential approach faces similar problems.
6 It does not seem that we want to say of a particular, x, y, and z, that they are declining in number. In my view, while 'the lion' appears to be a singular referring term (like 'the Supreme Court'), it is in fact a plural referring term. When we predicate various properties to lions (or relations to lions and to other things or places), we employ what are variously known as "variably" or "indefinitely" polyadic predicates (see 5 Ghiselin and Hull base many of their arguments on what they take to be the failure of the view that species are natural kinds (and therefore, they think, sets). Imaginative failures occur on the other side of the aisle as well. Arthur Caplan, in his paper defending Species-as-Classes, writes that "the matter at issue is whether biological species are best viewed as individuals or as classes of individuals" (1981, 131) . Likewise, the second section of Kitcher (1984a) is entitled "Sets versus Individuals" (310). 6 As Wolf points out, other less obvious surrogates (e.g., 'The number of lions alive on the Serengeti Plain is approaching zero') are possible. But there does not seem to be any general pattern to generating such surrogates (2002, . discussion in van Inwagen 1990, 23-28) . Often, these predicates will have a collective application, rather than the distributive forced on us by first-order logic. So long as technical questions about the logic of plural reference and quantification can be answered, 7 it strikes me that the language of plural reference carries certain advantages over even plural quantificational approaches. Here is one: biologists spend much time characterizing species in such a way as to equip statements about a particular organism's species membership to carry inferential weight. Suppose I tell you that Gao Gao is a panda (that he is one of the pandas). You are now entitled (on the basis of your background knowledge about pandas) to infer that Gao Gao eats bamboo (or perhaps you now have an explanation for why your prized bamboo plantings are in such disrepair). Treating such predications even in terms of plural quantification involves challenges similar to those mentioned above in connection to singular quantification. Suppose (following van Inwagen 1990, 26-7) we use 'the xs' (and cognate phrases) as a plural variable which can be bound in the usual way by the quantifiers. So, For some xs, the xs are pandas and the xs eat bamboo, is true just in case there are some bamboo-eating pandas. But this is not enough to gain the meaning of 'The Panda eats bamboo'. For it is compatible with bamboo-eating being exceedingly uncommon. At this point, a straightforward universal quantification looks tempting, viz.:
For all x, if x is a panda, then x eats bamboo.
And unlike our previous example with the declining lions, the 'eats bamboo' predicate easily succumbs to a distributive reading. However, it is probably not true that every panda eats bamboo -genetic variation has a habit of ruining universal generalizations. Marc Lange notes that this problem might be alleviated to some extent by treating the above quantification as implicitly prefixed by a ceteris paribus proviso. He takes the fact that the biological literature typically employs predicative statements of the form 'The S is T' over 'All Ss are T' as evidence of this (1995, 437) .
Of course, not everyone is as fond as Lange is of ceteris paribus clauses. The plural reference route may offer a more desirable alternative. Familiar uses of plural referring terms tolerate exceptions. This seems especially compelling in the case of demonstrative plurals, as when I gesture to a group of people, saying 'those demonstrators are loud'. I could have said something true even if there are some silent sign-holders among those demonstrators. One might reply that the intuition on which I'm drawing stems from an ambiguity between a collective and a distributive reading of 'are loud': read collectively, those demonstrators might be loud only in virtue of several very loud individuals among them. Perhaps so, but even in cases where the predicates are evidently distributive -as in 'those demonstrators are lazy' -, it seems that what I'm saying is that, for the most part, people in that group are lazy.
FURTHER QUESTIONS
Your intuitions may differ from mine. I certainly have not produced a robust semantics for plural attributions, as I suspect that this would be a monumental undertaking and I am lazy too. At the very least, though, it seems that a claim like 'those demonstrators are lazy' ought to defeasibly entail that if someone is among those demonstrators, then they are lazy. In different contexts, though, different standards for the security of such inferences may presumably be in force. And subtle modifications of the predications (saying that those demonstrators are each lazy) can affect the stringency of the sentence's truth-conditions. It also seems possible to treat plural referring expressions as only vaguely referring to some individuals. Indeed, perhaps it could be indeterminate whether some terms refer to anything at all. This indeterminacy, being a semantic matter, need not give us nearly the pause that should the ontic vagueness I contend SAI-ists need. I leave further exploration of this matter to another time.
What about the question of rigidity? Here too I must be brief, as this is complicated territory that needs further exploration, but it seems to me that plural referring expressions can at least sometimes be treated as non-rigid. Rumfitt describes several cases in which he is initially tempted to read the plural expression in this way. Case (1) is: "A possible world in which all the Channel Islands save a smaller one -let it be Hermare in their actual locations, but in which Herm lies fifty miles to the west of the rest of the archipelago" (2005, 120) . At first glance, though Herm is actually one of the Channel Islands, it might not have beenand likewise, that if Herm had not been one of the Channel Islands, the Channel Islands would still exist. The same apparently applies to plural demonstratives (those demonstrators would still have been loud had one of them decided to sleep in). But on reflection, Rumfitt decides that each of his cases of apparent non-rigidity should be understood differently: perhaps "it is essential to a geographical item such as an island that it should be, more or less, in its actual location"; or perhaps 'the Channel Islands' is really a covert definite description "rather than a genuine plural term" (121). Whatever we think of his discussion of these cases -and Rumfitt himself is quite tentative, offering the thesis that plural referring expressions are rigid "as a plausible conjecture which has yet to be refuted" (122) -it seems clear that we should not want our species plural referring terms to be counted as rigid.
8 Consider again Sober's example: He is among the Homo sapiens, but might not have been. If 'The Homo sapiens' refers rigidly to all us actual humans, then it does not survive modal changes that it clearly should survive. If treating species names in a (pluralized) Russellian manner is the only way of achieving this affect, then so be it. A more attractive suggestion (underdeveloped though it must remain here) is that different uses of species names in different discourses employ different semantic properties of those names. Sometimes referring to a species appears to be nothing more than referring to its actual members (either rigidly or non-rigidly); other times it appears that we are more interested in the sorts of properties and relations these organisms share in virtue of which we refer to them in the first place. Sometimes our predications to these pluralities have a distributive connotation; other times they function collectively. Comparatively little has yet been said about the semantic properties of plural names in general (though see Laycock 2006; McKay 2006 ) -but judging from how we use them in other contexts, it seems hopeful that a robust theory of plurals would accommodate these complexities.
SO, ARE SPECIES REAL?
The plural approach to species reference is not supposed to vindicate realism about species taxa, but rather to allow for the question of species realism to sidestep the percussive metaphysical debates about species' proper ontological category. More precisely, it represents a minimal metaphysical commitment to species about which defenders of different, more meaty approaches might accept in common. I suggest that species are collections of organisms 9 which bear those properties and relations which suffice to make them the particular kinds of things they are. Which properties and relations? This is obviously a big question. I haven't the space to share my specific opinions about this, except to suggest that scientific practice must figure prominently (if not exclusively) in how this question should be answered. Consider again the Pleiades galactic cluster. Is it real? An equivocal answer is tempting. One might believe that while there really are such composite things as stars there are no further objects of which those stars are parts. And yet there is a clear sense in which the Pleiades galactic cluster is real. For there are some stars which satisfy the qualifications devised by astronomers for being a galactic cluster. Given the meaning of that predicate, it is objective fact about the universe that the stars to which we refer with 'the Pleiades galactic cluster' jointly satisfy it. Species, by analogy, may be reckoned as real to the extent that there are some organisms that satisfy the relevant biological criteria -in such a way, say, as to figure prominently in our inductive and explanatory practices. On some views, including mine, this puts such pluralities well on their way to being natural kinds (see Boyd 1991, 139) .
I've said little about natural kinds and how reference fixing works for plurals. Isn't the thesis that species are natural kinds the proper alternative to the thesis that species are individuals? As I have tried to encourage, thinking about the debate in this way obscures more parsimonious and ecumenical options. Increasingly, philosophers are coming to realize that a natural kind is not an ontological category (Boyd 1999; LaPorte 2004; Chakravartty 2007) . Natural kinds can in fact crosscut ontological categories like sets, individuals, properties, relations, events, processes, and so on. I believe the possibility that certain pluralities might count as natural kinds deserves exploration. The case of species seem a good place to start.
